How to Write a Senior Thesis:

A Very Brief Introduction to Social Science

Boston College
Department of Political Science

Acknowledgements

This handbook was written for Boston College undergraduate students by Boston College graduate students in the Political Science Department. In many respects, its content is based on what those graduate students were taught by the faculty members in the Political Science Department, either through graduate seminars, private meetings, or never-ending email inquiries. It could not have been written without them. We would like to thank the following professors in particular, all of whom read drafts of the handbook and provided many helpful suggestions, more than we were able to incorporate: Kathleen Bailey, Gerald Easter, Kenji Hayao, and Peter Krause. Furthermore, Professor Easter's course, "Comparative Politics: Graduate Field Seminar," and Professor Krause's course, "Terrorism, Insurgency and Political Violence," were indispensable sources and authorities for much of what is said below.

We also would like to thank the Office of the Provost and Dean of Faculties at Boston College for its financial support. This project also would not have been possible without a generous Teaching, Advising, Mentoring Grant that was awarded to the Political Science Department by the University Council on Teaching for the 2017-2018 academic year.

own thesis could poten

To be sure, not every word will be perfectly relevant to each and every one of you, but much of it will be, and we will help you to avert your eyes when good old common sense recommends it.

Finally, this handbook is an ongoing project in the Political Science Department at Boston College. All content found therein is subject to possible, and likely, revision.

Part I: How to Do Social Science Research

Chapter 1: Asking the Right Question

Causal Questions

- Under what conditions does a democracy arise?
- Why do some countries become democracies, while others do not?
- What causes some countries to become democratic and others non-democratic?
- What explains the spread of democratic forms of government?
- Why do some countries develop a parliamentary system, while others develop a presidential one?
- What makes a democracy sustainable?
- Why do democracies fail?

A social science project attempts to answer a causal question by answering the two other types of research questions: a theoretical question and an empirical question.

The **theoretical question**

- What caused the breakdown of democratic rule in Germany following World War I?
- Why have many countries in the Middle East not democratized since the end of the Cold War?

A helpful way of thinking about the difference between an empirical and theoretical question is to think about whether the question you are answering contains any proper names or places. In general, a theoretical question does not contain any proper names or places. It does not ask a question about a specific person, movement, or country. It asks a question about abstract ideas, movements, or other political phenomena. In contrast, notice how the empirical questions listed above refer to specific countries, time period, and political systems.

❖ Quick Tip: Your theoretical question should not contain any proper names or places.

To help clarify what all of this means, we will be discussing many more examples below. In light of its importance, however, let's take a look at one quick example before moving on. One of the major theoretical questions in political science is: where does democracy come from? As was just shown, this question can be formulated in a number of different ways. The origins of democracy is a big, theoretical question, and some of the most well-known books in political science have attempted to answer this question.

One of the most well-known of these books is *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* by Robert Putnam, published in 1993.[3] In the introduction to that work, Putnam writes: "The central question is: What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?" That is Putnam's theoretical question; in effect, he is asking: under what conditions does democracy emerge? And how does Putnam go about answering this theoretical question?

His answer came from studying Italian politics in the 1970's. Sometime around 1970, Italy changed from being a centralized administrative state to a partially decentralized one governed by 15 to 20 regional governments or councils. Tn 0 0 00.2] TJ ET 50 (t) -2 (o)20 (e -2 (lm BT 50Tf [(w) 22 (

Normative Questions

Normative questions ask about what should happen, or what ought to happen. They ask questions

B. Osama bin Laden and Terrorism.

1. The descriptive question: did bin Laden become a terrorist?
2. The causal (empirical) question: why did bin Laden become a terrorist?
3. The causal (theoretical) question: why do people become terrorists?
4. The normative question: should an individual become a terrorist?

C. World War I and War.

1. The descriptive question: was World War I a war?
2. The causal (empirical) question: what were the causes of World War I?
3. The causal (theoretical) question: what are the causes of war?
4. The normative question: should nations fight wars?

Let's take one more quick look at an example from natural science. Now, this example may seem rather frivolous, but hopefully it will illustrate why a causal question is more important, or more interesting, than a descriptive question, keeping in mind that social science hopes to emulate the natural sciences.

Would the following question be worth asking if you were a natural scientist? "Did the apple fall on Newton's head?" Obviously, the answer is no. But the empirical question does seem to be a bit more interesting: "Why did the apple fall on Newton's head?" And from this empirical question it is easy to arrive at one of the most important theoretical questions in all of natural science: "Why do objects fall to the ground?" The answer to the last question explains not only why the apple fell on Newton's head, but also why the moon falls toward the Earth: the universal law of gravitation.

Policy Questions

There are, in fact, additional types of research questions that social science tries to answer. **One of the most prominent types of research question, and perhaps the typeyp earc4( ) -70 9 (e) 4 (ar)4 (c4(p**

It is, of course, entirely possible, and appropriate, for a senior thesis to ask and answer a policy question. Indeed, it is a relatively popular course of action. Not surprisingly, many students who write senior theses are especially interested in contemporary events and pressing issues.

However, you might want to first ask yourself what policy recommendations necessarily, or at least should, presuppose. If you want to recommend a policy that is intended to solve a problem, is it not necessary to determine what causes the problem in the first place? Is it possible, or

At this point, you might make the following objection based on what was said above: **in theory, doesn't a social scientist choose his or her theoretical question first and then he or she chooses his empirical question?** Accordingly, isn't the student already off to a rocky start if he or she has already spent a lot of time thinking about an empirical project?

Well, in practice, it is rarely the case that a political scientist chooses his or her theoretical question first. After all, all of us read, learn, and think about the world on a daily basis. Therefore, it is perfectly natural, if not inevitable, if you develop some ideas about a particular, empirical project before thinking in-depth about a general theoretical question.

- ❖ Quick Tip: In practice, social scientists think about their empirical questions before formulating their theoretical questions.

In any event, you will surely need help from your thesis advisor in doing all this. Based on your particular, empirical interests (i.e., Egypt, the Islamic State, the Six-Day War, etc.), your thesis advisor will help you to identify a number of suitable theoretical questions (i.e., democratization, terrorism, armed conflict, etc.)

And if there is one point at which you should incessantly rea 102 (a0.24 (t)-2 .24 (i) 4 (-2 .24 (4 (102 (a0.0

O'Neil, Patrick. *Essentials of Comparative Politics*. 3rd ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010.

Singleton and Straits, Chapter 2, "The Nature of Science," in *Approaches to Social Research*. 5th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

What, then, are the differences between history and, say, political science or sociology? There are many, to be sure, but the most important one for our purposes here concerns formulating a theory.

Recall that Chapter 1 claimed that the ultimate, or ideal, purpose of an empirical question is to shed light on a bigger, theoretical question. It was suggested, for example, that identifying the factors that led to an authoritarian rather than democratic regime in Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring could explain why countries, in general, become democratic. **To put it another**

Chapter 3: Choosing Your Research Method

Once you have chosen the theoretical question you want to explore in writing your senior thesis, the next step in the process - again, generally speaking - is to decide which method you will use in your inquiry. As Chapter 2 just briefly explained, an empirical question that explains a single case will not suffice. **This step takes us to the next key aspect of social science methodology to be discussed in this handbook: research method.**

Much of what will be said in this chapter is taken from an article by Arend Lijphart, entitled "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," which you are highly encouraged to read.[5] It is not an especially difficult text, but much of its content extends beyond the scope of your present aims. This chapter serves to highlight some of Lijphart's essential points that can aid in getting your thesis off to the right start.

The principal disadvantage of a large-*n*

will be rather strong, but their external validity will be rather weak. That is to say, after doing a single case study, you will have a very solid and thorough understanding of a single case; your answers to the descriptive and empirical questions are likely to be conclusive. However, you will not know whether or not your conclusions can be generalized and applied to other cases.

As Lijphart notes, "science is a generalizing activity," and thus the scientific status of a single-case study is rather ambiguous. Accordingly, a "single case study can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving an established generalization." Nonetheless, he concludes that a single-case study can make an "important contribution to the establishment of general propositions and thus to theory-building in political science."[9]

Accordingly, a single-case study can make for a great senior thesis project--if it is done correctly. Certain approaches to a single-case study would be much more valuable than others. In the rest of this section, we will devote some extra space to fleshing out what a good single-case study looks like, and how a single-case study can be theory-relevant. **Its purpose, in part, is to bring us back full circle, to Chapter 1, but we will be returning on a new founda**

The first two types of single-case studies fall under the first category, and the last four types fall under the second:

A. Single-Case Studies: Descriptive or Empirical-Focused:
    1. Atheoretical case studies;
    2. Interpretative case studies;

For example, let's once again use the case of Egypt during the Arab Spring. A well-known theory concerning the question of democratization argues that a certain level of economic development is necessary for a country to become democratic. If you were to write a senior thesis that amounted to an interpretative case study of Egypt during the Arab Spring, you could read all about the purported relationship between wealth and democracy. You could then use that theory to help explain why Egypt did not become a democracy.

Such an approach to your senior thesis would undoubtedly be an improvement over the atheoretical approach, since you would at this point be delving into what scholars have said about democracy in general, rather than simply Egypt alone. Moreover, you would discover that the theory about the relationship between wealth and democracy has several variations, and you would need to decide which theory best illuminates your specific case.

Hypothesis-generating case studies. This type of single-case study is the first of the four types that are more focused on the theory aspect than the case itself. In a hypothesis-generating case study, a case is used to transform some rather vague hypothesis into a more concrete one that can be subsequently tested with a larger number of cases, all in the hopes of formulating a theory.[15]

Theory-confirming & Theory-infirming case studies. The theory-confirming case studies and the theory-infirming case studies are analyses of a single case within the framework of established theories. The single case is used to test an existing theory, and it will either strengthen or weaken that existing theory.

Now since the theory in question has presumably been formulated on the basis of multiple case studies already, the results of your particular case study would not be all that decisive. That is to say, your case study can neither definitively prove nor disprove an htcashT Q Q q /Cs0heory.

identify relevant variables that were neglected in the earlier case studies. A deviant case study may weaken, slightly, an existing theory, but it may also suggest a refinement to the theory that ultimately strengthens it.[17]

Choosing Your Cases

Regardless of whether you choose a small-*n* case study, or a single-case study, you will be confronted with the task of choosing your specific cases. **Generally speaking - and to stay committed to our pledge of simplicity and clarity - choosing your case(s) is a task to be tackled together with0 50m /TT21 0.2-7 q 0.24 0 0 0.24 12 589150f( ) -15 (a) 4 (k) -4 ( )-7 . ET Q q [illegible]**

proceeds. However, the decision to reduce the number of cases is not simply an attempt to reduce one's workload. Students discover how much work is required to understand one case correctly and thoroughly, and so breadth of understanding is sacrificed for depth. Thus, you should not expect to do any less work if you decide to examine one case instead of two, for your advisor's expectations regarding your knowledge of that one case will be higher than if you were examining two cases.

The principal disadvantage of doing a single-case study is the risk of getting lost in your case and failing to engage in the larger theoretical questions with which you are concerned. By examining a single case, you are more likely to provide nothing more than a narrative, that is, a descriptive account of what happened in your case study. At best, you will answer the empirical question, but you will fail to enter into the bigger debate on your theoretical question.

While a small-*n* case study has the disadvantage of requiring you to become familiar with more than one case, its principal advantage is that small-*n* case studies necessarily involve comparing, and comparing will likely prompt you to step back and consider the larger picture, that is, to think more about the theoretical question. When examining two cases side by side, you are likely to notice when the same factor, or variable, is at work in both cases, or to notice that a certain factor is present in one case, but absent in the other. All of this will help you decide which combination of factors constitutes the answer to your theoretical question.

the best approach to a senior thesis. **But doesn't the single-case study bring us back to the procedure of Chapter 1, which was subsequently found wanting?**

The extensive discussion of the different types of single-cases studies was intended to show that, despite its limitations, the single-case study can be a worthwhile approach to social science. In particular, the single-case study does a good job of illuminating what your twofold task is when it comes to your senior thesis.

On the one hand, you want to examine, thoroughly and accurately, a specific case. You want to find out what happened and why it happened. In so doing, you will learn much about how to use primary and seco

Chapter 4: Reviewing the Literature

Before moving on to the next general step, let's quickly review what the process sort of looks like so far. But, again, bear in mind that this is hardly a fixed or exhaustive procedure.

1. Choose **a theoretical question** to investigate.
2. Choose which **method** you will employ to formulate your theory: either **the experimental, statistical, or comparative method**.
   2.1. You will most likely choose **the comparative method.**
3. Choose which comparative method you will employ: either **the large-*n* case study, small-*n* case study, or single-case study.**
   3.1. You will most likely choose between the small-*n* case stud0 (s) 9 (m0 04 (l) n -10((or)-2 (he) 24

However, “the literature” does not include every piece of writing that deals with your research question. As you have no doubt increasingly learned over the last few years, books, articles, and other forms of written material can vary greatly in terms of quality, and much of it will not be

What the Literature Review Should Do

Now that it is clear what “the literature” is, let’s discuss what the lit review should do. The purpose of a literature review is to summarize, analyze, and evaluate the most important literature that concerns your chosen topic. The best lit reviews are able to explain and synthesize everything that is essential for the given research project, and they are able to omit everything

finding on your particular topic. Page limits would be met long before you review even half of the literature. If you are writing on World War I, you will not be able to cover the cause of every war in human history. You will need to make a judgment call about what is important enough for your lit review and what is not.

Ideally, your lit review should draw some conclusions and make some judgments about the body of knowledge that concerns your theoretical and empirical questions. Is it complete? Is it missing interesting insights? Where do those gaps exist? Why do those gaps exist? Has new evidence emerged that weakens or strengthens existing arguments? Is the overall conversation being misunderstood, or misrepresented, somehow?

These latter questions move a lit review beyond a mere collection of short summaries into a critical synthesis of a given body of knowledge. A lit review should not be a list of books and articles along with summaries of their respective arguments. Such an approach might be a useful first step--a step which Part II will actually make a case for.

But the final product should be more analytical, which can be done in several different ways. For example, one analytical approach is to group the different types of arguments together. While one section of the lit review discusses the rational choice arguments to the theoretical question, another one discusses the structural ones (see Chapter 6). From there you might indicate the ways in which your argument advances the literature by bridging the rational choice and structural arguments. In the next section, we'll discuss in more detail another way to organizing the lit review: the chronological approach.

It might be helpful to think of the lit review in the following twofold way. On the one hand, it is an end in itself. Forcing yourself to summarize and analyze the current state of literature will help you to become an expert in your given theoretical question. When you are finished, you should feel comfortable listening to, and perhaps even participating in, the conversation that is taking place about the causes of democracy, terrorism, or war.

On the other hand, the lit review, ***ideally***, is a means to the rest of your thesis. The manner in which you summarize, analyze, and evaluate the literature should set up the rest of your argument. It will help your reader understand what your particular contribution will be to the (uTJ E) -2150 0e 18 (r) -7 (a) 4 (t) -2 (ur) -7(he -2 (.) 10 ( )] TJ ET Q q 0.24 0 0 0.24 12 589.92cm BT 50 0 49 -

The second pitfall to avoid is to proceed as if it is necessary, or even possible, to overturn the entire existing literature on your theoretical question. This point is very much related to the lengthy discussion we had in Chapter 3 about the value of a single-case study. Partly because you are unlikely to examine a large number of cases, it is unlikely that the answer to your empirical question will succeed in providing an entirely novel answer to your theoretical question.

But that does not mean that your study cannot make some contribution. You should focus your efforts on trying to identify a very specific aspect of the literature that your single case can help to improve, weaken, or clarify.

The Structure of a Lit Review

While there are different approaches to the literature review, it typically contains three subsections: an introduction, main ilr ,ry -7 ( ) -90(on) -20 ( )T Q q 0.24 0 0 0.24 12 589.92 cm BT 50 0 0 50 4

The Two Main Approaches.

You need to explain to the reader why the relevant themes (grouped by subheadings) are important and why you chose to organize them the way you did. **This type of organizational structure is called a "funnel": your concepts/themes should be organized from broad to specific. You begin with the broader theoretical discussions on your topic, and make your way toward discussing studies that refer directly to your own research.**

Let's say you are examining altruism in children. At the top of your "funnel" are you

Reading the lit reviews of other scholars will help you to write your own. How did they do theirs? How was it organized? Chronologically or thematically? What was effective, and what was not? What books and articles did they discuss that your lit review should cover, too? *Annual Reviews* is a journal that attempts to review a body of knowledge for the sake of establishing the current state of the literature on a given topic. This is a very good source for your literature review, but it can also show you how to write your own.

Suggested Reading

Galvan, Jose L. *Writing a Literature Review: A Guide for Students of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, 7th Edition.* New York: Routledge, 2017.

Knopf, Jeffrey W. "Doing a Literature Review." *PS: Political Science and Politics* vol. 39, no. 1 (Jan., 2006): 127-132.

The second step is to refine the universe of cases. This process of refinement should be guided thoughtfully by your research objectives and the particular methods being used. Under no circumstance is it appropriate to select cases based on which ones you like more, or which ones you are more familiar with, or which ones you think will be easiest to gather data on. (To a large extent, obviously, this will be unavoidable for a senior thesis project).

outcome is not really identical in the two cases. While Egypt's military defected and staged a coup, Russia's military defected but stayed on the sidelines during the revolution. Furthermore, numerous other differences can be identified that distinguish the two cases from each other: the impact of World War I, the difference in previous regime type, the influence of communism, religious differences, and socio-economic differences. Thus, we cannot credibly claim that the military defections can be attributed to military structure.

Concepts, Typologies, and Operationalization

i. Concept Formation

After asking the right questions, and picking the

As a more concrete example, consider the concept of democracy. This term is notoriously difficult to define and varies with every study that takes up the topic.[19] Early in the democracy literature, the concept was defined simply in a procedural context. It said that a country is a democracy if it holds regular elections. This definition began to shift with the rise of competitive authoritarian regimes in which rigged elections are frequently held by dictators to maintain the façade of democracy while retaining dictatorial control. The definition expanded to include more requirements such as a free press, civil liberties, legalized party competition, and the like. Each of these new requirements needed to have certain thresholds, above which they could be said to exist in a certain country.

These differences matter a great deal. The Democratic Peace Theory says that democracies don't go to war with each other. However, this argument is criticized as being dependent on strict and very high standards of "democracy." If we relax the standards by which we classify a country as a democracy, then we can find instances of war between them. The theory also depends on how the other concept in that argument is defined: war. Is war a violent conflict between two or more countries with more than 1,000 battle deaths, or is 500 battle deaths sufficient? Answers to these questions result in vastly different conclusions about the question of whether democracies go to war with each other.

When designing your study, you will need to clearly define all the concepts you are using. Furthermore, you will need to justify why you are defining a concept the way you are. If you are using a free press as a requirement for democracy--why? If you are asking about the relationship between negative or positive news stories about a president or prime minister and a democracy's disposition for starting a war (diversionary war theory says a leader will start a war to distract from a scandal at home), then it would be necessary to include a free press in your definition of democracy. However, it would be less necessary in a study that examines the effects of the legislative process on dispositions for war. Decisions about inclusion or exclusion should be based on theoretical considerations. Do the theories you're dealing with say free press needs to be considered? An initial step in making these decisions is to look at what previous authors have done.

John Gerring has written a pivotal article on what makes a concept good.[20] His suggestions are very useful when considering the usefulness of a concept. In most circumstances, it's advisable to use concepts that already exist. Many scholars have worked very hard for many years to develop and perfect the concepts we use. More likely than not, then, your senior thesis will be

[19] Robert M. Fishman, "Rethinking Dimensions of Democracy for Empirical Analysis: Authenticity, Quality, Depth, and Consolidation," *Annual Review of Political Science* 19 (2016), 289-309.

[20] John Gerring, "What makes a Concept Good? A Criterial Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences," *Polity* 31, no. 3 (1999), 357-393.

able to select among the many existing conceptual definitions. Nonetheless, understanding the conditions that make a concept good will help you to use these definitions correctly.

Gerring created a list of 8 conditions that determine a concept's 'goodness.' Here, we will only discuss the most important aspects of conceptual goodness. For the full list, see the Gerring article.

1. **Familiarity.** The concepts we use must be familiar to both the academic community, and to the wider audience of lay people. There is very little use to develop a concept that is not easily understood outside of the handful of academics that work with the concept.

2. **Resonance**. This one is difficult to explain but it basically asks if the concept sounds good and resonates with people. A good example that Gerring provides for resonance is Marx's choice to use the work 'proletariat' rather than 'working classes.' Not only did proletariat have more resonance with people but the choice to abandon the status quo term was deliberate and added to the overall theme of the work.

3. **Parsimony.** The more complicated a term is, and the longer the list of necessary or sufficient conditions, the less value it has. In some circumstances, complexity will be unavoidable, but authors should strive for simplicity over complexity.

4. **Coherence**. The concept should be internally consistent. The concept and its attributes should be logically related to each other.

5. **Differentiation**. The concept must effectively distinguish itself from other similar concepts. The attributes assigned to terrorism are designed to distinguish it from other similar concepts, like criminal (personal) violence, revolutions, insurgencies, or state violence.

ii. Typologies

Simply defined, a typology is a way of classifying types.

iii. Operationalization

Once you have clearly defined the concepts you are going to use, you need to clarify and justify how you are going to measure those concepts. Operationalizing a concept simply means clarifying how a concept is to be measured.

This is much more difficult than people give it credit for. Consider these two books and how they deal with legitimacy (one of the most difficult concepts in political science to define and operationalize). Paul Miller, in *Armed Statebuilding Operations,* says that if a state loses legitimacy, any armed intervention must focus on re-establishing this legitimacy. Miller has a great discussion about legitimacy and exactly what is meant by legitimacy. Miller even mentions how legitimacy can mean different things for different people. However, when Miller operationalizes the concept he decides to measure it as having had a democratic election. This operationalization is problematic since many democracies have very low levels of legitimacy, and many authoritarian regimes have high levels of legitimacy (like China). Democracy can certainly be used as an indicator, but it is far from necessary or sufficient for legitimacy to be achieved.

Bruce Gilley, on the other hand, in *The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy*, systematically defines and operationalizes the concept. He then uses a vast number of indicators to create an index of countries ranging from most legitimate to least legitimate. Some of these

In order to help think about what the causal mechanisms might be, and to return to the example above, it helps to draw a diagram (see Figure 1). Draw your IV on one side, your DV on the other, and then write the possible causal mechanism in the middle. Not only does this make our explanation for the causal relationship more convincing, it also helps us to focus our attention on

Chapter 6: Giving the Right Answer

As you design your project and conduct your research, it is worth bearing in mind one last aspect of social science, which concerns the character of the answer you provide to your empirical and

beings - regardless of time and place - operate with the same internal wiring, so to speak. The desires and fears that motivate one individual are similar, if not identical, to the desires and fears that motivate any other individual. Rational choice is individual-

By way of another famous example from a seminal social scientist, one of the most well-known cultural arguments is found in Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber argues that Protestant ethics and ideas explain the origins of capitalism. Capitalism was not simply a consequence of greed, he argues, which has always existed, but a set of moral ideas and values concerning hard work, industry, and material success. "Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins," Weber writes of this ascetic Protestantism. "The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one's own election."[29] This set of ideas and values constitute the "spirit of capitalism."

Structure

Structural theories examine the role played by formal and informal relationships within institutional contexts. These can include: government bureaucracies, professional bureaucracies, social-economic classes, elites, legal systems, military organizations, religious institutions, political parties, interest groups, and/or the family. Behavior, customs, identity, and beliefs - those factors with which cultural theorists are primarily concerned - are regarded as effects of these types of relationships. The human capacity for freely willed action is limited; we are constrained, not by cultural forces, but by the structural elements that precede them. If rational choice theorists focus on reason, and cultural theorists focus on rules, then structural theorists focus on relationships.[30]

discussing politics in the classroom. Nonetheless, l

Unfortunately, these few examples are not truly sufficient in order to understand what rational choice, culture, and structure mean. Indeed, a great variety of examples are needed to do so. Fortunately, Part II of this handbook will provide many additional examples of these three approaches. Please keep the content of this chapter in mind while reading those chapters.

Concluding Remarks

There are two important things to keep in mind about these theoretical approaches when writing your thesis. **First, rational choice, culture, and structure are umbrella terms, so we strongly encourage you not to get into the habit of using them.** When your advisor asks you to provide an answer to your theoretical question, you do not want to say, “It’s structure,” or, “It’s culture.” Structure is not an answer unto itself. Culture is not an answer unto itself. These are just terms, and very vague ones at that.

Of course, you need these terms and theories in your head as a starting point. When you first try to answer your theoretical question by distinguishing between these explanations, you will do it at8 (18 ( ) TJ ET Qq 0.24 0 0-2 (l) -2 (l)) -T Ql2 (l)al you n 70 (be) h0 0-2 () -10 (c) 4 (ha) Qq 0.24 0 0-2 (r) -7

ii. Convince the reader of the importance of your question or puzzle.

Your question or puzzle is likely to be very specific; this is where you can bring it back to the bigger picture. Why is it important to solve the puzzle or to answer the question?

iii. Define the key terms.

Any complicating terms that may not make sense to those outside your discipline should be explained here. Are you talking about an area of the world people may not know about it? Provide some context. If there is a specific lexicon associated with your research, briefly clarify any potentially confounding terms here.

For example, let's say your research examines women who wear the hijab: briefly define the term "hijab" for the reader. Any concepts or variables that that will be measured, such as "democracy," "authoritarianism," "secularism," etc., will be defined later in the methods section.

iv. Outline the paper.

can be your own definition or one that you took from an academic source. This is called operationalizing your variables, as discussed in Chapter 4.

b. Defend your cases.

If you are engaging in statistical analysis, explain your control variables. If you are doing a comparative case study, then this is where you argue on behalf of your cases. Why are they the best ones to examine? You have to convince the reader that the cases you have chosen are worthy, and that they are the best ones to help you answer your question/unravel the puzzle.

c. Data collection.

This subsection is especially important for quantitative analysis, but is equally relevant for qualitative work. For statistical analysis, explain the dataset and attach a copy, as well as the codebook, at the end of your paper. If you conducted a survey, explain how you gathered your data and also attach it at the end of your paper. For qualitative work, what sources did you rely on? Did you look at newspapers, go to archives, conduct interviews, etc.?

5. Main Body (Empirics: Case Studies and/or Data Analysis)

This section is the meat of your paper, and where you discuss your case studies. This is also where you analyze your findings.

If your paper is primarily based on statistical analysis, you should divide this section into two parts: a) data and b) analysis and interpreting your findings. Otherwise, for qualitative work, this is where you discuss your case studies.

This section is generally flexible, but make sure to include a brief introduction that restates the cases you will analyze and why you selected them. You have already done this earlier, so this is a quick restatement.

You should include subsections that provide a clearer framework from which you conduct your analysis. These subsections are not intended to summarize the cases. Rather, you should consistently explain how each case relates back to your question or puzzle. You are providing

1. methods	a. Independent + dependent variables b. Defending cases c. Data collection
Main Body (Empirics)	Case studies or data analysis
Conclusion	a. Recap b. Further questions c. Policy implications

Suggested Readings

Becker, Howard Saul. *Writing for Social Scientists: How to Start and Finish Your Thesis, Book, or Article*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

Bernard, H. Russell. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches.* Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2000.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Part II: A Brief Introduction to Social Science Literature

Preface to Part II

Having presented, in summarily fashion, the most important aspects of political science research, we now turn to the actual literature in political science. There are four main objectives of Part II.

1. To help clarify what was talked about in Part I. Although some examples were provided in Part I, some of the content could be rather abstract at times. Accordingly, we hope that the examples in Part II will help to answer questions that may have arisen while reading Part I. **While reading, or even skimming through, Part II, do not lose sight of the forest for the trees.** Focus on the fact that each chapter is devoted to answering **some variation of the "why" question** discussed in Chapter 1, and that **specific, usually historical, cases studies** are used in order to answer those larger theoretical questions. Also focus on the fact that cases which might seem to be unrelated can be used in a comparative analysis to draw more general conclusions.

2. To introduce you to some of the most important questions that are addressed in the social science literature. In effect, this returns us to the all-important topic of Chapter 1: the big, theoretical questions that social science tries to answer. We've touched on one or two of them already in Part I, such as where does democracy come from. In Part II, you will be introduced to nine more such questions. **It goes without saying that you are not required to pick any of these questions for your thesis, although you are certainly welcome to do so. They are chosen primarily to give you a better idea of what political science is trying to do and what questions it is concerned with.**

3. As discussed briefly at the end of Chapter 4, the following chapters are intended to help you get started on your literature review. In many important respects, the following chapters are not proper literature reviews, since all they really present is a rather simple summary of several different works. However, they may provide a helpful approach if you are having trouble at first. Simply writing up 1-2 page summaries of a relevant work's main arguments is a good a place as any to start. As you are writing these summaries, you are likely to discover a more appropriate way to organize your literature review.

4. To point out some of the problems that you are likely to encounter while doing your political science research. **In Part II, you will see that political science isn't as neat as we made it out to be in Part I.**

4. “Essential Readings” will be a list of other major works that are related to the big, theoretical question. In the first place, we simply do not have enough space to discuss all the works that we would like to discuss. But moreover, there are some works in political science that don’t conform nicely to the methodology we present in Part I. For the sake of clarity, we have chosen not to discuss many of these.

Chapter 8: Why Do Countries Become Democratic?

A. The Question

One of the most prominent theoretical questions in social science concerns the emergence of democracy. Why have some countries become democracies, while others have not? What are the necessary preconditions for democracy to emerge? Under what conditions does democracy develop or flourish? What attitudes and behavior must be present for countries to democratize? What obstructs or prevents the development of democracy? Why are some countries more resistant to democratic change? **Despite subtle differences, all of these questions are more or less asking the same fundamental question: what are the origins of democracy?** Works that are devoted to answering this question are often referred to as the democratization literature or regime-transition literature. They attempt to identify the actor92 cm a aore or

bit, the empirical question of their work is: why has democracy successfully taken root in Great

and fourteenth-century France. In effect, their empirical question is: what role did taxation play in the development of parliamentary democracy in thirteenth-century England and fourteenth-century France?

Bates and Lien begin by discussing a common fiscal imperative of European monarchs: securing revenue for the sake of prosecuting war. And the process by which these monarchs secured their revenue depended on the type of wealth that they taxed. While England primarily taxed trade and

In the introduction to this work, Putnam writes: “The central question is: What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?”[40] That is Putnam’s theoretical question; in effect, he is asking: under what conditions does democracy emerge? And how does Putnam go about answering this theoretical question? His answer came from studying Italian politics in the 1970’s. Sometime around 1970, Italy changed from being a centralized administrative state to a partially decentralized one governed by 15 to 20 regional governments or councils. Two decades later, it was rather clear that the regional governments of northern Italy had generally prospered and showed signs of being a healthy, viable democratic community, while the regional governments of southern Italy remained undeveloped and its political institutions undemocratic. Thus, Putnam’s empirical question is: why did the regional governments of northern Italy develop the way they did, and those of southern Italy develop the way (e) 4 ( ) -50 (of) -2tr i mdio7 (s) 29 ( )]24 4 ( ) -50 (of) -2nt P r ofe4 ( ) -2 (ho 4 (Q q 0.2-7 ( )2 (ona)24 4 (

This more recent work examines political developments following the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarian regimes. In the late 1980's

This work is also a good example of many other difficulties lurking in Part I and that will reappear in subsequent chapters. For example, the distinction between a theoretical and empirical question is somewhat problematic here. Are Levitsky and Way really asking about the origins of democracy, or is their research confined to a particular regime type (competitive authoritarian regimes) and to a particular time period (post-Cold War)? In other words, does their answer to their empirical question shed any light on the large theoretical question?

Furthermore, on the surface, their explanation seems to be very much structural one, insofar as it focuses on the international system and the relationships between the West and the specific

Boix, Carles. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

Geddes, Barbara. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996.

---, eds. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*

Chapter 9: Why Do Revolutions Occur?

A. The Question

One of the most dramatic and consequential phenomena in politics is the revolution. These political upheavals fundamentally change states and societies and change the course of history. For decades, historians and political scientists have studied the great and minor revolutions of

Brinton argues that revolutions begin with the state in severe, likely economic, crisis. At some point, revolutionary movements emerge to challenge the state openly and the state is unable to suppress them. As the "old regime" is swept away, moderate and radical revolutionaries begin to struggle among themselves for power. **At first, a moderate government emerges but the moderates are soon overthrown by the radical elements. Brinton argues that radicals prove successful for a number of reasons, including their better organization, their stronger loyalty, and their greater willingness to turn on their former allies.** The rise of the radical revolutionaries is marked by a reign of "terror and virtue" as they seek to violently impose their values on society. This period is followed by the "Thermidor" when the new regime begins to moderate itself and, in many cases, reverts to the old ways.

Brinton offers an intriguing model of revolutionary movements that fits very well for three of his

6.) *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, by Samuel Popkin, 1979.

Finally, in *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*, Samuel Popkin sought to refute the findings of Scott by studying the history of peasants in Vietnam. **Arguing against the idea of a "moral economy," he develops the concept of a "political economy," arguing that peasants are inherently rational and seek to maximize benefits for themselves**. In brief, a peasant will join a rebellion if he or she believes it is likely to help them personally.

7.)

Chapter 10: Why Do Social Movements Emerge?

A. The Question

Scholars of social movements have addressed various theoretical questions. When and why do movements radicalize? Why do movements succeed or fail? Is violence and effective tool of social movements? **The most fundamental question in social movements research, however, is the most obvious. Why do social movements emerge at all?** Given the risks often associated with taking part in a movement, especially in authoritarian states, the fact that large numbers of people would choose to participate is an intriguing phenomenon. Mancur Olson noted this puzzle in his work,

2.) ***The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process*****, by Jo Freeman, 1975.**

The above theories have since fallen out of favor. Subsequent researchers found that it is socially connected individuals who are more likely to join movements. Jo Freeman studied the rise of the women's rights movement in the United States in *The Politics of Women's Liberation.* **Freeman examined the first two waves of the feminist movement, seeking to explain why the women's movement emerged in the 1960's.** Contrary to early social movements research, **Freeman finds that social connections were necessary for the movement to form and that the socially isolated are less likely to join a movement.** Freemen argues that an already established social network among women was necessary for the movement to emerge.

While Freeman's study has only a single case (the women's movement in the United States), **she divides this case by examining two separate branches of the movement that diverged over time.** By comparing these separate branches, she is able **to identify those factors** they share that contribute to the rise of movements **as well as those variables that caused them** to develop differently, the most important of which was the presence of an existing social network that was capable of mobilizing people around the goal of achieving women's liberation.

Freeman also draws heavily on the theory of relative deprivation to explain the emergence of social movements. This theory is rooted in Alexis de Tocqueville's observation that people are more likely to rebel when conditions are actually improving. **Relative deprivation theory holds**

Freeman's work is part of the move towards the resource mobilization approach to the study of social movements. Resource mobilization focuses on how social movement organizations (SMOs) marshal and employ the resources (people, public support, etc.) that are available to them. **This trend marked the shift from focusing on purely larger environmental variables that can cause people to join a movement and towards the examination of the networks and leaders that are capable of mobilizing these potential followers.** This approach became, for a time, the dominant approach to social movements research, and Suzanne Staggenborg's *The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict* reflects this approach.

In her study of the pro-choice movement in the United States, Staggenborg traces the development of the movement from its inception in the 1960's to the 1980's and **examines thirteen separate SMOs.** She makes use of the writings of SMOs and their

Freemen, divides it into several sub-cases. In this case, McAdam divides the movement into distinct time periods which he analyzes separately. Through this historical analysis, McAdam traces the rise and fall of the movement and **identifies the variables that were necessary for the movement to emerge and succeed.**

McAdam's work marks the beginning of the shift towards the eponymous political process model in social movements research. He argues that the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement was part of an ongoing process which involved **the interaction of multiple variables including the nature of the political environment, the resources available to activists, and the strategies employed by leaders of the movement.**

In particular, **McAdam emphasizes the importance of preexisting social networks in the black community prior to the emergence of the actual movement.** These networks, supported by black colleges and churches, created a community that could be mobilized under the right political circumstances. **However, McAdam finds that these networks were only able to mobilize people and form a movement when provided with effective leadership and favorable political conditions which emerged following World War II.**

5.) *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil,* by Anthony W. Marx, 1998.

While the political process model has now become dominant in social movement research, certain theoretical concepts that have been developed in European academia have begun to make their way into American political science. Notably, the examination of identity formation and how it contributes to the rise of movements has received greater attention. Anthony Marx's book, *Making Race and Nation*, reflects this approach.

Marx attempts to explain the emergence of social movements by asking why the United States and South Africa saw the rise of race-based rights movements while Brazil did not. Marx performs a detailed historical analysis of **three states with similar backgrounds but**

possible. **By identifying the difference between these states, Marx identifies the independent variable that causes the different outcomes.**

Marx argues that the divergent outcome between cases is explained by the different needs of the state-building elites in each country. In the United States and South Africa, the state emerged from major internal conflict (Civil War and Boer War) and faced the need to restore stability. They faced a divided white population with a competing white elite (South and

Chapter 11: What Explains the Religious Resurgence?

A. The Question

Beginning as early as the 17th century, social scientists and Western intellectuals have predicted the "end of religion." In a 1968 *New York Times* interview, prominent sociologist Peter Berger judged that by the 21st century "religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture."[51]

The model: Also known as the "religious market model," the authors choose to forego the "demand" side of the equation (i.e. the public's demand for religion), which they assume to be constant. Instead, they focus on the model's "supply" side: conditions of religious freedom and competition between religious institutions.

The argument: Religion is "strong" in some places and "weak" in others because it depends on the initiatives of religious leaders and their institutions. **In other words, the greater the competition between churches, sects, and denominations in a community, the more difficult it becomes for leaders to maintain their congregations and the more efficient they must become in order to attract and keep followers.** For example, competition between religious institutions in the US occurs because mainstream denominations such as Catholics, Lutherans, and Protestants are continually challenged by rival evangelical churches.

Methodology: First, the authors present several hypotheses. Some examples of these hypotheses are: an institution's ability to create a religious monopoly is dependent on the state's use of coercive force to regulate the "religious economy."[53] They also propose that a religious economy is more likely to be pluralistic when it is unregulated, and that firms will be more likely to specialize if the religious economy is pluralistic. To test their hypotheses, they looked to quantify measures of pluralism and regulation in order to explain variation in religious participation. Using statistical analysis, they conducted several tests of the theory using data from various sources.

Findings: After analyzing their results they found that in areas where religious regulation prevents competition between religious "firms," religious participation is "also stifled."[54] That is, religious competition promotes efficiency, which encourages what they term "religious consumption."[55]

2.) ***Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide,*** **by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, 2011.**

Wh4 (.92 cm BT 50 0,nc)9onous.92 cm76 -695 -2 (r) -7] TJ ET Q Q q 12 -13p(t) -9on ho ous S h(ous) 2(ous) 2

The goal: Instead, they propose a theory of the secularization thesis based on "existential security" which accounts for a religion's "worldview."[57]

Methods:

Argument: **Juergensmeyer argues that the religious revival is a backlash against secular nationalism**, **which began to be perceived as "morally vacuous and politically corrupt."**[59] In this scenario, religion becomes "the ideology of empowerment and protest," and "what was primarily a worldly struggle takes on the aura of sacred conflict."[60] He argues that "the conditions that lead to conflict are a matter of social and political identity."[61]

Methodology: **Juergensmeyer engages the case studies approach by analyzing political movements in the Middle East, South Asia, Europe and the United States.** He relies heavily on interviews with militant activists, religious leaders, and religious leaders of political parties. His qualitative approach engages **both a structural and rational-choice explanation for the emergence of global rebellion movements.** He relies on government structure to explain rebellion movements, and also sees religion as a mobilizing force that is adopted by individuals for political ends.

Findings: Juergensmeyer views religious and secular nationalisms as competing ideologies who disagree on the source of legitimate political authority. The author identifies two "ideal types": the religious-activist and the secular-nationalist. For the former, legitimate authority is( ) -90 (,a BT 50 0o) -1

forces that are most distinctive to the modern world."[62] These forces include democracy,

explanations to explain their findings. The scope of their analysis, including the number of cases and regions studies, had a significant impact on their findings.

C. The Sub-Questions

The religion and politics subfield is relatively new, and, as noted above, has developed in tandem

Chapter 12: Why Do Statebuilding Operations Fail?

A. The Question

An examination of the armed statebuilding operations literature is a difficult task, in part because this chapter will use the term *armed statebuilding operations* to cover a diverse range of political phenomena. The works in this chapter cover the following concepts: foreign-imposed regime change, foreign occupations, armed democratizations, as well as armed statebuilding operations. Each of these concepts vary quite a bit, but they all highlight similar dilemmas and limitations of the most prominent form of war since the end of World War II. **To oversimplify somewhat, they seek to identify the causes that explain why statebuilding operations succeed or fail.**

In general, the literature on statebuilding operations follows a similar pattern found throughout political science. A major event shifts the focus to a new phenomenon; scholars try to explain the new phenomenon with little literature to draw upon; and then methods and understanding improve over time. During the Cold War, interventions were mostly covert, and it was rarely the objective to build a new state or regime after the intervention had toppled the adversary one. The end of the Cold War prompted a new concern with rebuilding failed states, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. With the new wave of "nation-building" came a new scholarly interest in explaining the phenomenon. This first generation was highly descriptive and lacked methodological rigor. A good example of this approach is *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, by James Dobbins and several others.

Successive waves of literature have branched off into specific areas and improved theoretical development and methods. For instance, the usage of the term nation-building was almost entirely eliminated since these operations weren't actually trying to build a nation, which is a community of people based on identity. It's more accurate to say that an operation is an occupation or a statebuilding operation. Works also began to focus on specific causal factors that could determine success or failure. The works below are a small selection of these subsequent waves, but are good representatives of some of the best work produced.

B. A Brief Introduction to the Literature

1.) *Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail*, by David M. Edelstein, 2004.

This book seeks to answer a simple question: why do some occupations succeed and others fail? We often say in political science that we love a good puzzle, and a good way to gain people's interest is to find a case that was supposed to happen a certain way but didn't. Edelstein says that he was driven to write the book prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2002 and because of the

fact that Germany's post-WWII occupation was being held up as a blueprint for Iraq. Iraq and Germany are dissimilar in many ways and it is unreasonable to think that one could be a blueprint for the other.

Edelstein begins by doing two very important things: he defines his concept and he defines what constitutes success and failure. "Military occupation is the temporary control of a territory by a state (or group of allied states) that makes no claim to permanent sovereignty over that territory."[66] Edelstein spends another page and a half discussing how occupations are distinguished from other military operations like colonialism and nation-building. **Based on this definition, Edelstein counts 26 occupations that have taken place sinn3 (h) - 4 (1815i) -2 .on**

people will recognize the value of the occupation; and 3) if the occupier has a credible exit strategy, then people are less likely to oppose the occupation.

2.) *Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency*, by Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, 2009.

Similar to Edelstein, Lyall and Wilson's article deals with the dynamics of occupation and also with a puzzle. Below is a graph that shows the percentage of conflicts won by the incumbent since 1800. Since around 1875, the percentage of incumbent victories has steadily declined. **Lyall and Wilson attribute this to an army's decreasing ability to win the counterinsurgency that arises after major combat operations have ceased and the occupation begins.** Many scholars have attempted to explain the increasing frequency and effectiveness of insurgencies. **These included modern technology, the collapse of colonialism, and nationalist and identity issues, but Lyall and Wilson choose to focus on the strategy of the occupying force instead (if you want to add value, do something that others haven't)**. [67]



Lyall and Wilson notice that the decrease in counterinsurgency (COIN) effectiveness over time coincides with the rise of unit mechanizations. For most of the 19th century, and parts of the 20th century, army expedition forces had very little mechanization. They were known as foraging armies. They would march into and around the territory they occupied, relying on local resources and markets to sustain the army. This would lead to a high level of interaction between the local people and the occupation forces. Today, the increasing lethality of the battlefield has led to an increasingly isolated army. Soldiers move around the villages in tanks and armored

[67] Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *International Organization* 63, no. 1 (2009): 67.

personnel carriers. When they are in the base, they are surrounded by concrete and earth barriers, and access is tightly controlled.

This variation explains the decrease in effectiveness. "Why do mechanized forces perform counterinsurgency so poorly? Put simply, the force structure of modern post–World War I militaries inhibit the collection and vetting of the context-specific information required to wield power discriminately."[68] Mechanized armies do not interact as much with the local population, which inhibits their ability to gather information and intelligence, which inhibits their ability to apply force in a limited way. Indiscriminate use of force increases resentment and support for the insurgency.

Lyall and Wilson used a research method known as mixed methods, because it combines the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. They run a regression on a data set that shows a highly significant and negative relationship between mechanization and successful COIN. They then go into in-depth case studies of two US army units with similar, adjacent areas of operation in northern Iraq. The 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) is a mechanized unit and fits the typical

environment, including ethnic cleavages, economic development, and previous experience with democracy.[69]

The authors test their argument using an online database known as Polity III, which is a dataset that records a significant amount of data on different regimes, like origin of the regime, time in existence, and occurrences of external and internal conflict. This allows the authors to determine which democracies where externally imposed and how long they lasted compared to democracies that weren't externally imposed. They also augmented the dataset with other sources.

Based on all this, **the authors identify 36 imposed democracies that meet their criteria from 1816 to 1994.** Of these, 24 failed during the period of observation. **The authors find that the environment in which a democracy is imposed significantly influences its probability of survival.** Previous experience with democracy can help to overcome some of these problems. Also, economic prosperity can help extend the life expectancy of a nascent democracy. International, not just domestic, environments can also have an impact. Regional security threats reduce the durability of democratic regimes. With regards to choices, the duration of stay, either through colonialism or occupation, were shown to have a positive impact on democratic survival, although these effects are relatively weak compared to environmental factors.

The statistical methods used by the authors allow them to build a model of Iraq and Afghanistan and to predict the probability of survival for each of these new democracies, the results were not great. The model predicted a 50% chance of failure within 30 years, and a 50% chance that democracy would last more than 5 years in Afghanistan. The authors then note that while 50% chance of failure within 30 years in Iraq seems relatively good, their standard of "democracy" is a very low bar, which seems consistent with events in Iraq since the publication of this article.

C. The Sub-Questions

Political Scientist often compare themselves to the natural sciences, and, as such, ask whether their efforts have resulted in progress towards a better theoretical understanding of the world. While it is said that the natural sciences progress in a linear theoretical direction, the social sciences often deal with the same concepts and theoretical problems in cyclical patterns. However, progress within the statebuilding literature is quite clear. Throughout the years of research, similar factors have emerged as deterministic and significant for the success and failure of these operations. Often divided between pre-existing environmental factors and policy choices, environmental factors are preeminent. Ethnic heterogeneity, economic development, previous experience with democracy, and regional security environments determine the outcome

[69] J. Michael Greig and Andrew J. Enterline. "The Durability of Imposed Democracy." *International Interactions* 40, no. 2 (2014): 166-190.

of most armed statebuilding operations before they begin. Within this framework that is set before the operation begins, there is a small window of opportunity in which opportunities can have an impact. Unfortunately, these choices can have both positive and negative impacts.

Future research in this area should focus on two things. First, how does the environment and choices interact in these operations? This is somewhat in line with Edelstein's work. Duration and footprint are choices that impact the success rate, but depend on certain environmental condition to be successful. What other choices can be made that have different effects in different environments? **Second, if the environmental conditions are held constant, what are the varying impacts of different choices?** This research agenda has more policy implications than the former, and could lead to some good papers. It is unlikely that political leaders will select a country in which to intervene based on the likelihood that it could be successfully converted to a democracy. Most of these countries are either already democracies, or do not pose a security threat to other countries, like the US. Those countries that are most likely to pose a security threat to the US are also most likely to have poor conditions for democratization. Therefore, what can be done to maximize the probability of success?

D. Essential Readings

Edelstein, David M. *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation*.

present during both events. "Constants are not likely to be able to tell us why some historical periods are more war prone than others," Greg Cashman tells us. "If we wish to find why war itself is not constant, we need to find *variables* in the structure of the international system that vary with the changing rates of war."[73]

In a later work, Waltz seems to recognize this argument. "Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain war's dismal recurrence through the millennia."[74] In attempts to escape the dilemma, **other neorealist scholars began to incorporate other variables into their analyses to explain variations in war and peace, such as, the polarity of the system, the degree of anarchy, or the offense/defense balance.**

2.) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, by John Mearsheimer, 2001.[75]

"Offensive realism" is a branch of structural or neorealist thought often associated with John Mearsheimer's *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* Theories of structural realism, such as Mearsheimer's, largely ignore cultural differences between states, the ideology of a state's political leadership, as well as the state's regime type (despotism, democracy, etc.). This indifference stems largely from the fact that the anarchic structure of the international system creates the same fundamental incentives for all states, according to Mearsheimer, regardless of their cultural, ideological, or governmental configuration. **Anarchy forces a state, he argues, to pursue enough power to protect itself.**

Furthermore, if geopolitical circumstances permit, Mearsheimer contends that a state, particularly a major power, should aggressively pursue a strategy of hegemony while also trying to stop other major powers from becoming hegemon. This the "offensive" part of neorealism. In contrast to Waltz, Mearsheimer contends that states are not just security maximizers, but power maximizers. States can never really be secure, and only by maximizing their power can they ensure their survival.[76] For Mearsheimer, there is no amount of power that could ever satisfy a state.[77] **This strategy gives rise to a constant competition for security, which, in turn, gives rise to the constant possibility of interstate war.** Thus, we arrive at what Mearsheimer calls the "tragedy" of great power politics: great states seeking their security are likely to be forced to engage in battle with their rivals to ensure their security.

Also in contrast to Waltz, Mearsheimer rejects the certainty of a balance-of-power arising. Since weak states are not eager to incur the costs associated with challenging powerful states by allying

---

[73] Greg Cashman, *What Causes War? An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict* (New York: Lexington

with other weak states, they will 'buck-pass' (i.e., they will let other states take the initiative in balancing the threatening power) until their security is actually in peril.[78] This 'buck-passing' indicates that aggressive states cannot be checked as easily as Waltz contends, which creates a greater incentive to strive for hegemony. So, if we combine these lower disincentives with the perennial threat posed by other states, the best way to ensure a great power's survival is for it to pursue an aggressive strategy of hegemony.[79]

To empirically test his notion of offensive realism, Mearsheimer applies his theory to a study of the history of great power politics from roughly 1792 to 2000. As one might expect,

relative to the possible changes in policies that the attacker may be forced to accept if it loses; and (c) the relative strengths and interests of all other states that might intervene in the war."[84] The expected utility of a war strategy is a function of the sum of the utilities of the possible outcome times their probabilities.[85] **Accordingly, we cannot dismiss the likelihood that war is the outcome of a leader's rational calculation that by initiating a war, the state will be placed in a better position than if it remained at peace.**

Bueno de Mesquita tests his theory against empirical data from the "grandfather" of all data-gathering projects on war: the Correlates of War (COW) Project. **He claims that it does a better job than power capability theories of predicting the onset of war from 1816 to 1980**. Bueno de Mesquita's model was, nonetheless, met with equal amounts of praise and criticism.[86]

4). *The Wages of War, 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook*, by J. David Singer and Melvin Small, 1972; and *The Correlates of War Project.*[87]

The Correlates of War (COW) project was started in 1963 by the political scientist J. David Singer. Joined later by historian Melvin Small, the COW began its work by systematically collecting quantitative data on interstate wars in the post-Napoleonic period. **But Singer 0 () Tj E1 (r) -7-7**

definition of interstate war that has helped to guide the research of scholars since its publication.

5). *The Origins of Major War,* by Dale Copeland, 2000.[88]

Scholars of international relations also study **systemic-level transitions**, such as the so-called rise of China. That is, they examine whether these kinds of impending transitions in power will be peaceful, combative or perhaps even nonexistent.[89] In practice, the outcome of such transitions have varied very little. Most systemic-level transitions have ended in major warfare. **It is, however, still worth investigating exactly *why* these transitions so often led to interstate war.**

In *The Origins of Major War*, Dale Copeland provides an interesting answer. By synthesizing elements from different strains of realist thought, Copeland argues that the likelihood of war between major powers is largely determined by the interaction between military power differentials and the likelihood of survival faced by a state. Weak declining powers rely on diplomacy to preserve themselves and their interests, but powerful states prefer to draw the sword and go to war.

6). *The Clash of the Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* by Samuel Huntington, 1996.[93]

Lake, David A. and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic Choice Approach,” in David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., *Strategic Choice and International Relations.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Levy, Jack S. “Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China,” in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., *China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. *Causes of War*. Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Morgenthau, Hans J.

cooperation between states. The two primary attributes that Abbot and Snidal argue make IO's so attractive are their *centralization* and *independence.*

The core of their argument is that these two attributes enhance efficiency.[101] Through centralization, IO's provide a support system that allows states to negotiate with a dedicated administrative structure set up to support cooperation by providing negotiating forums, monitoring and documenting reputational effects, and providing agreed upon rules and regulations for interaction that reduce transaction costs.[102] They also go beyond being the most efficient form of understanding, they are also able to influence and shape the terms of states interactions. Through their independence, IO's act as neutral arbiters that enhance and protect the legitimacy and efficiency of bargaining.[103]

However, the authors are not tgo the mtance of oe. ey rencntze tat str

Yet, Ikenberry argues that by creating a "legitimate and mutually acceptable postwar order" that "get(s) the willing participation and compliance of other states," the winner is able to conserve and prolong its power.[104] Orders built upon coercion and dominance are fragile, open to challenge and contestation. However, those orders that other weaker states accept, while sacrificing short term dominance, gain long term compliance in the form of the winner being able to lock in favorable arrangements that outlast its power. The nature of "constitutional" orders allows the losers to realize that their losses are limited and temporary, and offers transparency and voice opportunities. They are thus more likely to support the system than to resist and eventually overturn it.

Creating these new orders has dramatically changed with the rise of democratic states. The post-WWII order presented unique features that contributed to the US rise and continued international position. Ikenberry argues that the extent of power disparity at the end of the war, and the type of states that are party to the agreements, determine the incentive and capacity of the victor in designing a post-war order. The rise of democracies has changed the way that the international system is governed. The increasing number of democracies and the reliance on "constitutional" orders have muted the importance of power in international relations. Additionally, the nature of democratic states has facilitated even greater connections and linkages, helping to explain the continuing stability of the post-WWII democratic order.

Jeffrey Legro approaches the issue of cooperation by determining where preferences are formed, taking a "two-step" approach to understand cooperation. **First, he argues that preferences are a product of the organizational and bureaucratic culture of states, driven by internal, rather than external, factors.** The focus on "ideational more than material forces and the internal, rather than external setting" allows Legro to understand exactly what a state's preferences are by looking at how they are formed.[105] Not all

excessive arms buildups, and dangerous competition. They also allow states to spend resources

than not. Under these conditions, the losers decide to cooperate, not because of hopes of maximizing gains, but minimizing losses by not cooperating.

In Gruber's view of cooperation, **the fear of being left behind is the key motivator.** However, the power he describes is different from bargaining power or even coercive power. It is the power to not need cooperation, and powerful enough to design the rules of the game in such a way that the losers realize they have to cooperate to g

But what explains the durability of the order and continued cooperation? In contrast to other theories, **Gruber incorporates domestic level variables to explain why subsequent leadership coalitions in states are likely to continue cooperating.** In order to gain buy in and discourage internal successors from challenging the system, agreements are not fully specified at the outset, which leaves open the possibility of change. This helps gain buy in from the losers and their continued cooperation because they can expect to modify the rules of the game later on. This also gains by in from internal successors and helps to explain why the losers are likely to remain inside the system instead of seeking its overthrow for a better deal.

Gruber's work is a very dense and deeply theoretical work, as many in the international political economy realm are. **However, the core of his empirical argument rests around two large case studies, the Nor**

And finally, what explains the particular type and structures of c

Chapter 15: Under What Conditions Does Deterrence Work?

A. The Question

At the heart of security studies lies the issue of use of force, and one way to threaten use of force is deterrence. Therefore, the research project into deterrence has motivated scholars to ask a wide range of questions. What is deterrence? A widely accepted definition is as follows: deterrence is the threat of retaliation to "prevent an adversary from doing something he might otherwise be tempted to do."[114] Related to this question is how we know deterrence succeeds or fails when we observe it. The answer derives from the definition of deterrence: if the adversary does not do "something," deterrence works. **All these questions concerning definitions, however, serve to answer a fundamental question asked by the deterrence literature: under what conditions does deterrence work?** Scholars try to identify factors that determine results of deterrence from systemic, state, and individual levels. One caveat, though, is that this question is too comprehensive to ask in any single work. Nonetheless, this chapter will try to sketch a general yet oversimplified picture for this question.

B. Brief Introduction to the Literature

1) *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, by Glenn H. Snyder, 1961.

With other early works, this book laid the groundwork for the deterrence research project, such as distinguishing deterrence from defense. Moreover, written in the early stage of the Cold War, Snyder devoted a large part of this book to nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, one major contribution of his work was to provide a framework to analyze how deterrence works. Snyder started this analysis with the statement, "deterrence is a function of the total cost-gain expectations of the party to be deterred" (Challenger).[115] **By doing so, he characterized the state as a unitary actor that makes policy decisions based on the cost/benefit analysis.** In other words, Snyder adopts a rational deterrence model.

The next question is what variables would affect this cost/benefit analysis. Snyder listed four

deterrence can be successful. How can the defender affect this matrix? Snyder offered two variables, which are the most fundamental variables in the deterrence research. The first one is

defender’s previous behavior in d

Understanding crises as a sequence of actions by the challenger and defender, Fearon revised arguments about the balance of capabilities and interests in the deterrence dynamics. **In order to do so, Fearon introduced an important variable in the deterrence literature, costly signals.** As Fearon's model suggested, the challenger's prior belief about the defender's preference heavily impacted the effectiveness of deterrence. Moreover, costly signals, such as mobilization, allowed states to update their belief about adversaries' willingness to use force. As a result, when information about relative interests or capabilities is available it will make a difference.[127]

As to the conclusion, Fearon differentiated immediate deterrence from a general one. First, if the strength of the defender's interest in the protégé are available before a crisis begins, general deterrence is likely to succeed while immediate deterrence is likely to fail. Moreover, measures of defender interest revealed during a crisis is likely to lead to immediate deterrence success. Second, the more the ex-ante balance of capabilities favors the defender, the less challengers will threaten on important issues, and the more likely is a costly signal to succeed. Meanwhile, ex post measures of the relative military of the defender revealed during a crisis is likely to increase the effectiveness of immediate deterrence.[128]

Compared to Huth and Russett's conclusions, costly signals play a key role in Fearon's argument. The question he does not elaborate on, however, is whether all kinds of costly signals have the same impact. In a later paper, Fearon distinguished between two types of costly signals: audience c

important role in the deterrence research. He argues that deterrence relies on the manipulation of incentives, which are properties of individuals.[131]

Mercer's *Reputation and International Politics* represents an attempt to apply cognitive psychology to the deterrence research. As the title suggests, this book focused on the role of reputation in determining results of deterrence. For the rational deterrence model, commitments are interdependent and past behavior would affect others' expectations of your future behavior.[132] Nonetheless, Mercer disagreed with this argument. On the contrary, he argued that not all kinds of past behavior could form reputation. In the book, Mercer tried to use the attribution theory to explain reputation for resolve. According to this theory, Mercer argued, policy-makers' policy was the most salient to them so that they would make attributions about their allies and adversaries based on results of their own policies. Subsequently, allies and adversaries could get reputation from these attributions, and reputation in turn would affect results of deterrence in the future situations.[133]

To what reputation do different policy results lead? In sum, Mercer's conclusions were: 1) allies could not get a reputation for standing firm and adversaries could not get a reputation if they backed down; 2) adversaries would get a reputation for resolve if standing firm and allies would get a reputation for irresolution if backing down.[134] It is worth highlighting that, according to Mercer, the defender's backing down will not hurt its credibility for deterrent threats in the future. **In order to test this theory, Mercer applied it and rational deterrence theories to three cases: the first Moroccan Crisis, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis, and the Agadir Crisis.** He argued that rational deterrence theories could not explain the weak relationship between reputations and crisis outcomes in these cases.

Mercer's book provides a different perspective and useful insights into the deterrence research. Nonetheless, this work has two main shortcomings. First, Mercer's case studies failed to consider situational variables. For instance, he did not compare changes in military balance in three pre-WWI cases. If we throw those situational variables in the analysis, these three cases may be overdetermined

C. The Sub-Questions

The first set of questions relates to the definition of deterrence. This question may not be as clear

Snyder, Glenn H.

Chapter 16: Why Did the American State Expand?

A. The Question

War and the state present a compelling discourse in political science. Charles Tilly argues that war "created the central organizational structures of states," and concludes that "the tendency for war to build state structure [has held] through much of world history."[136] Yet this issue has not been restricted to the realm of comparative politics. Much debate has arisen concerning the extent to which these dynamics have been at work within the United States. It has been

World War II, significantly transformed the American state from a free market capitalist system to “a uniquely American form of participatory fascism,” with private property and ownership rights that could be “readily nullified whenever political leaders deem it expedient.”[138]

Three crises precipitated substantial state development. During **World War I**, the United States "committed the nation to waging full-scale warfare," such as conscripting soldiers, nationalizing industries, increasing income taxes, and creating new agencies, many of which

the United States has served as an important exception to the theory of war and state-building.

Friedberg seeks to demonstrate that decisions made during the early years of the Cold War averted the creation of a "garrison state"; in essence, the type of state epitomized by the Soviet Union. Mobilization, industrial production, and other necessities pertinent to the preparations for possible war with the Soviets exerted "upward pressures" for statist development. However, countervailing tendencies tempered those impulses, moderating the ultimate form of American state-building and forging a Cold War "strategic synthesis."[146] **The growth of the American state was influenced by several key variables.** These included: the needs and demands of the military with regard to mobilization and preparation; the inclinations of the president; military bureaucratic interests; societal interests, such as business and labor; interests of congressmen; the institutional structure of the US, which includes the separation of powers; and ideology, the presence of a strong and prevailing anti-statist strain in the US. Each of these variables entered into the crafting of a Cold War strategy.[147]

Friedberg **assesses state growth by analyzing the "mechanisms of power creation** … the primary transmission belts through which the superpower confrontation made themselves felt in both societies."[148] They include the extraction of money; of manpower; direct resources to defense-supporting industries; the production of arms; and military research.[149] These mechanisms required significant coercive capabilities. Therefore, the degree to which the state expanded was predicated on the manner in which these needs were met.

In developing a rubric to measure this growth, Friedberg highlights specific elements within each power-creating mechanism. For the extraction of money, for example, it is useful

-2 (i)

minimal, and balance the budget.[150] Centralization and coordination of military technology failed to transpire as well. The US remained resistant to consolidation. Instead, a contract system was devised, which mobilized private energies on a large scale for public purposes. This had the positive effect of increasing flexibility and creativity. It was also more functional and effective than the Soviet model. [151]

Thus, on the whole, Friedberg concludes that the United States waged the Cold War without resorting to extreme levels of coercion and extraction that had occurred in the Soviet Union. Strong anti-statism ideology, such as free market capitalism, limited government, and personal liberties, coupled with interests and the institutional structure of the system, mitigated the excesses of statist growth.

3.) ***From Warfare State to Welfare State: World War I, Compensatory State Building and the Limits of the Modern Order,*** **by Marc Allen Eisner, 2000**.

By contrast, Marc Allen Eisner supports the argument of Higgs that war-making has substantially developed the American state. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the New Deal served as the basis for the modern American state, **Eisner's** ***From Warfare State to Welfare State*** **contends that much of the response to the Great Depression had its precedents during the First World War.**

Eisner places a heavy emphasis on an institutional framework to explain the political development of the United States. Bounded rationality, institutional rigidity, path dependency, as well as institutional restraints on human agency, have created certain rules and relationships that define socio-economic management. These variables often limit the menu of choices available to policymakers and dictate the actions undertaken to address a crisis.[152]

Eisner's study is qualitative and centers upon three distinct periods of American history. He first examines the government's mobilization efforts during **World War I** and the creation of agencies designed to manage war. He then shifts to the **post-war period** and assesses how the wartime model was subsequently applied to peacetime governance, including everything from business regulation and labor relations to agricultural policy and macroeconomic relations. Finally, Eisner analyzes **the governmental response to the Great Depression** during the 1930's, and demonstrates how the same model remained in place.[153]

---

[150] Ibid., 153.

[151] Ibid., 326-330; 334-339.

[152] Marc Allen Eisner, *From Warfare State to Welfare State: World War I, Compensatory State Building, and the Limits of the Modern Order,* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 4-11.

Eisner concludes that World War I had a dramatic effect on the development of the modern American state. Prior to the conflict, the United States was largely decentralized, with business and market activity privately controlled. But then a regime of compensatory state building

patriotism and idealism flourished alongside an intense pursuit of personal and corporate gain and of social objectives … The result was a war welfare state."[157]

Finally, Schaffer places great emphasis on the leaders at the helm of the state, in particular, the president, Woodrow Wilson. Describing him as a "man of pronounced contradictions," representing the idealism of Progressivism while enthusiastically leading the country into war. Wilson eventually became a social reformer, but "never seriously challenged basic economic arrangements." As such, his "foreign policies reflected his appreciation of American private enterprise."[158] Schaffer does distinguish his argument by stressing the role of the policymakers. While socio-cultural factors and material interests are important, the personal and political preferences of the president played a key part in the management of a wartime state.

The literature on whether the United States has witnessed appreciable state-building during war and crises is varied and diverse. Amongst the conclusions, some contributors, such as Friedberg, argue for the validity of the American exception, while others contend otherwise. **These studies have also revealed a panoply of potential variables that necessitate investigation.** Higgs focuses on ideology and culture as responsible for developing institutions, which henceforth shapes the prevalent Zeitgeist. Friedberg attributes ideology, interests, and institutions as mitigating factors to statist growth. Eisner stresses a highly institutionalist framework in explaining change, while Schaffer highlights cultural and social norms coupled with the rational pursuit of material gains. **Only once these factors have been re-examined, applied to other case studies, or additional variables devised can we ensure greater confidence in the validity and strength of the findings.**

C. The Sub

Chapter 17: What Explains the Behavior of Congress?

A. The Question

so as to demonstrate the competence of the congressman.[161] This has the effect of ensuring the representative does not stray too far from the desires of their constituency. Position taking is the highlighting of salient political issues and the compatibility between the congressman's considered judgment and that of the constituents.[162]

Mayhew derives his findings from personal experience on Capitol Hill during the post-war period. From his first-hand observational account of the operations of Congress, Mayhew is able to **empirically support his theoretical claims**, asserting, "I shall make a simple abstract assumption about human motivation and then speculate about the consequences of such behavior based on that motivation … At all points I shall try to match the abstract with the factual."[163]

2. *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*, by Richard Fenno, 1977.

Richard Fenno offers a different perspective on the behavior of legislators. In his article, "U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies: An Exploration," which was later published as a book entitled *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*, **Fenno strives to better elucidate how congressmen view their constituencies and why these perceptions are critical to explaining behavior.**

Fenno's research has yielded several insights into the manner in which congressmen perceive their districts. Fenno contends that these constituencies do not constitute single entities, but rather represent multitudinous layers of political and personal relationships. The largest constituency is the geographical, "the legal entity" with fixed political boundaries. For members of Congress, this circle is the "broadest view" of their district. It encompasses every voter and resident that lives within its borders. Yet congressmen do habitually further break down these entities into the varied subsets of partisan leanings, interest groups, and socio-economic or ethnic blocs that exist within them.[166]

The second circle is the reelection constituency. Collectively, these individuals represent the approximate cadre of partisan voters who can be depended upon to win re-

their family resides in Washington or in the district. Interestingly, the electoral margins have had little effect on time allocation. By contrast, congressmen are always uncertain about their reelection prospects, notwithstanding statistical data suggesting otherwise.[171]

The second home style activity is the presentation of self. In short, this comprises the image that the representative desire to leave on voters. They "will seek to control the response of others to him by expressing himself in ways that leave the correct impressions of himself with others." These can be accomplished by either verbal and nonverbal expressions. The presentation of self is intended to develop trust between constituents and the lawmakers by inculcating a sense of virtue and positive values to the latter's image. These include conveying a sense of qualification for the office, an identification with constituents, and empathy. "These three impressions are conveyed by the very fact of regular personal contact at home."[172]

The final home style activity is the explanation of Washington behavior. These actions entail clarifying votes and offering spirited defenses of those decisions. Fenno contends, "Every House member spends some time at home explaining and justifying his Washington behavior to his various constituencies." He goes on to argue, "The objective of every congressman's explanation … is political support." Thus, not only are voting record explanations important, but any activity in Washington that may be electorally beneficial to discuss is fair game, and falls under the auspices of his explanatory style, a deliberate and purposive method of justifying his behavior.[173]

3.) *The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection*, by John Aldrich and David Rohde, 1974.

Building upon Mayhew, **John Aldrich and David Rohde argue that the electoral connection is insufficient to explain contemporary congressional behavior.** In *The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection,* Aldrich and Rohde highlight a bevy of pertinent developments in Congress since Mayhew's publication in 1974. American political parties within Congress have grown stronger, more disciplined, and more conflictual since the 1970s.

To explain these changes, Aldrich and Rohde seek to modify several assumptions of Mayhew's electoral connection. They proffer three additional variables to understanding the motivations and behavior of congressmen. The first is a "broader perspective on member goals." **They**

important, and probably d

As far as candidates for office, Aldrich and Rohde examine a study that incorporated a 1996 general election survey of all House candidates. This data revealed virtually no convergence among the two political blocs of candidates. Republican candidates belonged to one pool, while Democratic candidates belonged to another. Finally, they assess a liberal-conservative NOMINATE score of every legislative member from two historic Congresses, 91st (1969-1970) and the 105th Congress (1997-1999). These numbers indicate a substantial overlap between the parties in 1969, and maximal party homogeneity in 1997.[177]

bills were taken into consideration, the seniority system, which empowered powerful, southern Democrats to exercise autonomy from party leadership, and the weakness of the party caucus in general, namely by its split between Northern liberals and southern conservatives.[180] Legislation

through documents and statistics, especially pertaining to voting records and ideological scores of congressional members.[187]

C. The Sub-Questions

The literature on Congress lends itself to further research. In light of stronger party unity and discipline within the institution, it is worth asking whether Mayhew's electoral connection remains relevant. Can his theory be retrofitted to apply to contemporary conditions? Aldrich and Rohde attempt to do just that. Does their argument satisfactorily address these changes? Similarly, Fenno's research into constituencies was written in the 1970s. With technological and social developments, do congressmen still perceive their districts in the same manner, and if so, does it explain their behavior? The discourse can be made richer with the inclusion of more contemporary in-depth analyses of Congress, how it operates as a body, and how its members behave individually. Determining which perspective (rational, cultural, or institutional) can adequately explain these dynamics requires valid measurements of the construct in question, as well as representative case studies that ensure solid, sound conclusions.

D. Essential Readings

Dodd, Lawrence C., and Bruce Ian Oppenheimer, eds. *Congress Reconsidered*. 7th Edition. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000.

Fenno, Richard F. *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Longman, 2003.

Fiorina, Morris. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment*. 2nd Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. *Congress as Public Enemy: Public At -2 (ne (69 (y)4 (0.24 0 5*

Theriault, Sean. *Party Polarization in Congress.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

Causal Question

Appendix B: Sample List of Theoretical Questions

The following list of questions is a sample of well-known and important theoretical questions from the four principal subfields in political science: American Politics, Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Political Theory. Some attempt is made to group these questions into further sub-categories within each subfield, though the lines are often very blurry.

It is by no means necessary to pick one of these questions for your thesis, and this list is far - very far - from being exhaustive. The questions are simply meant to provide some guidance if you are having trouble settling on a topic. You should also recall that at the end of each chapter in Part II there is a section entitled "Sub-Questions," in which you will find a paragraph that raises additional questions related to the chapter's primary one. Some of them re-appear below.

American Politics

➢ ***Political Thought of the American Founding***

As the primary author of the American Constitution, there has been a lot of ink spilled about James Madison's political thought.

- ! What did Madison borrow from Locke and Montesquieu, and how were these ideas adapted to the U.S. Constitution?
- ! How did Madison diverge from these thinkers?

Many of the founders considered themselves as part of a rich intellectual tradition. We know that they were extremely well-read, since we have records of the inventories of their personal libraries. In spite of this, when most of us think of American political thought, we focus on a handful of pages from Locke and Montesquieu.

- ! Which works of political philosophy influenced the founding generation?
- ! In what ways did those works influence the founders?
- ! How do these works help us to shed light on the American experiment?

In *The Federalist,* James Madison makes a virt4 (12 589.92cm BT 50 0 0 50 325 -1551 Tm /( ) -150 (a) 4.92 c

In *The Federalist*, the supporters of the 1787 Constitution successfully argued for the repeal and replacement of the *Articles of Confederation*. At the same time, the Constitution's opponents published eloquent critiques of the new document.

- What do the debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists tell us about American government?
- What did the Anti-Federalists contribute?
- Are those debates still relevant for us today?

➢ ***American Political Development***

In *Democracy in America,* Tocqueville writes about the importance of the Plymouth founding.

- To what extent is the Plymouth founding important to our understanding of American political development?
- To what extent do the founding histories of the states beyond New England challenge the supremacy of the Plymouth narrative?

At the time of the American Revolution, the two major strands of revolutionary thought came from Massachusetts and Virginia.

- How did each colony's culture and history affect the nascent conception of American democracy?

The Progressive movement attempted to balance out the professionalization of politics with a push towards direct democracy.

- Is this attempt a paradox?
- How do we balance the need for expertise and professionalization in a government based on democratic values?

While many Americans regard the United States as a nation of immigrants, assimilation of immigrants has always been a source of contention.

- How did immigrant groups assimilate into the American political community?
- What was the role of "machine" politics?
- Can all cultures be assimilated?
- Should they be assimilated? If so, how?

The Watergate scandal and the Pentagon papers led to a mistrust of government.

Slavery is America's original sin.

- How have our efforts to expunge the legacy of slavery and racism changed American political institutions?
- What are the unintended consequences?

Civil disobedience (as we understand it today) was first articulated by Henry David Thoreau, and later famously espoused by Dr. Martin Luther King—— two beloved American icons.

- What is it about civil disobedience that makes it such a potent form of expression?
- Is this a product of this country's culture or creed?
- Are our political institutions particularly receptive to civil disobedience?
- Does our love of civil disobedience promote a disrespect for American political institutions?
- Is civil disobedience still a powerful means towards political and social change?

➢ ***Separation of Powers***

The American system of checks and balances is unique among liberal-democratic countries.

- Would we have been better off with a parliamentary system?
- Should we adopt reforms that bring us closer to a parliamentary system?
- Have we already done so?

In the Constitution, passing legislation is difficult by design.

- Should regulations, executive orders, and legal opinions be considered forms of policy-making?
- Are these forms of political action constitutional?

In *The Federalist*, Madison writes about institutional loyalty.

- Has party loyalty supplanted institutional loyalty?
- If so, how did this happen, and what are the implications of this change?

➢ ***Public Policy***

The welfare state is a contentious issue in American politics.

- Is the American welfare state underdeveloped?

- What is the "imperial presidency?"
- Are the virtues of a unitary executive as extolled by Hamilton in *The Federalist* undermined by the federal bureaucracy?
- How have subsequent presidents fleshed out our understanding of executive power?
- How about prerogative?
- When did the president become the steward of the economy?
- Does this mark a change in our understanding of the executive office?
- How does our system of government hold the president accountable?
- Is the process of impeachment too difficult, or not difficult enough?
- Is the process too politicized?
- Are there other ways to hold the president accountable aside from impeachment?

Comparative Politics

➢ ***The State***

Comparative politics literature addresses the historical, institutional, economic, social, ideological, etc., foundations of the modern state.

- What is a state?
- What is a nation state?
- What distinguishes it from other forms of political organizations?
- What is the difference between a national and non-national state?
- Where does the state come from?
- When did the modern state system emerge?
- What accounts for the various kinds of modern states?
- What is the relationship between war and state formation?
-

- Why do certain parties choose to run on policy programs, while others choose to run on patronage?
- Why have political parties emerged as the primary channels of political representation in democratic governments?
- What explains variation in the strategies that parties use to mobilize electoral support?
- Under what conditions do parties adopt certain political strategies?
- How can we explain variation in how parties compete in different democracies?

➢ ***Political Instability and Social Movements***

Political instability spans a broad array of topics within comparative politics, which may include literature on revolutions, civil wars, and social movements.

- Why does political violence occur?
- Why is some political mobilization violent and some nonviolent?
- Under what conditions does political violence succeed?
- Under what conditions do civil wars occur?
- Under what conditions do revolutions occur and what explains variation in their outcomes?
- Why do social movements emerge?
- To what extent has globalization facilitated the spread of social movements?

- Under what conditions are women more likely to become heads of state?
- Under what conditions will states promote women's rights?

International Relations

➢ ***Causes of War***

The subfield of IR is primarily preoccupied with the causes of war. The literature addresses war's constant presence in history and sees it as a central problem. Why do wars start? How are they won? How can we prevent them?

- Why do 'rational' states go to war if it is so costly?
- Why do diplomacy and negotiation succeed in some cases but not others?
- Under what conditions will a rising power cause international or regional instability?
- Under what conditions does deterrence work?
- Why do some states sign peace agreements while others do not?

➢ ***International Political Economy, Cooperation, Intervention***

Certain scholars focus on international political economy and the importance of international economic activity. This had led to increased study of international finance, foreign investment,

- Is this only the case in the best regime?
- What are the crucial differences between the good citizen and the good human being?
- What are the differences between the contemplative life and the active or political life?
- Is the contemplative life superior to the active or political life?
- Is the best way of life devoted to justice, virtue, wisdom, money, freedom, honor, etc.?
- What is moral virtue? What are the cardinal virtues?
- Is moral virtue a necessary part of the best human life?
- Is the morally virtuous life the happiest way of life?
- Is the just life the happiest way of life?
- What is the relationship between justice, virtue, wisdom, and happiness?
- Are all of these things reconcilable?
- If they are not, what does this say about the relationship between the individual and the political community?
- What is the proper relationship between family and political community?
- To which association should mature human beings be most loyal: the family or the community?
- Is religion a necessary component of the best human life?
- Is piety a moral virtue?
- Are the lives devoted to philosophy, religion, and politics fundamentally opposed to one another?

➢ ***Modern Political Philosophy***

Modern political life has led to a whole series of questions that have become very familiar to our ears, but appear to be rather alien to older ways of thinking about politics.

- What is liberalism? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
- What is democracy and why is it a legitimate form of government?
- Is there an important difference between a good form of government and a legitimate one? Which is, or should be, more important to human beings?
- Do human beings possess individual rights?
-

- What is liberal democracy?
- Are there any conflicts or contradictions between the concept of liberalism and the concept of democracy?
- Is the concept of individual rights consistent with the democratic principle of majority rule?
- If there is a tension between liberalism and democracy, which of the two should we prefer?
- Is society based on a "social contract"?
- What can we learn about society by viewing it as a social contract?
- What is sovereignty?
-

- Can reason justify some norms or ideals and refute others?
- What is freedom? What is the relationship between freedom and law?
- What is the difference between private and public liberty, or negative and positive liberty?
- Are people free when they are not governed by law or when they have influence over the laws they live under?
- Is freedom a goal or merely the means for securing other goals?
- What is truth? Is truth worth pursuing for its own sake?
- When, if ever, are lies politically and/or morally defensible? Is the political sphere amenable to truthful speech? Why or why not?
- What are human values? Are they created by human beings? Or do they exist by nature?
- What is science, and what are the limitations of scientific knowledge?
- Is science worth pursuing for its own sake? If not, toward what end do we study politics scientifically?
- In analyzing human beings as individuals or in groups, is it possible to formulate "laws" of human behavior? What does the answer to this question mean for the scientific study of politics?
- What is the difference between facts and values? Is a "value-free" political science possible? Is such a political science desirable?
- What does history teach us about political life and thought?
- Does history provide moral or political norms? Does it undermine all claims to universality in moral and political matters?
- Does history unfold according to a rational process? Are we in modern times at the "end of history"? Should we welcome or lament the "end of history"?
- What are the possibilities for human progress? Is humanity always progressing? How should "progress" be measured?
- Are there some ways in which "progress" poses problems for human beings and for modern political life?

Appendix C: Literature Review Samples

The following two sections are intended to provide examples of what a literature review might look like. They are two separate, but connected, reviews that discuss the topic of transnational terrorism.

As briefly discussed at the end of Chapter 4, these examples should be understood as a sort of progression or improvement from what you read in Part II, for they do more than simply summarize what has been said so far on these topics. They identify fault lines within the literature; they provide arguments as to why existing definitions or explanations are problematic or insufficient; and they suggest new lines of inquiries. But they are still not literature reviews properly speaking, since neither really has a proper introduction or conclusion. We tried to cut

This report, and definition, were used later to explain the spread of such incidents in various regions.[194]

A 1982 study divided terrorism into a simple four-cell typology. Transnational terrorism was said to be any event that is not government directed or controlled and includes the direct involvement of nationals of more than one state.[195] Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev's study is often cited for definitional purposes in the transnational terrorism literature. "Through its victims, targets, supporters, or perpetrators, transnational terrorism concerns more than a single country. If the nationality of

significant problems in trying to generalize about such dissimilar events. Under the standard definition, this is an ongoing problem. This counterfactual is more than anecdotal. In one particular study, correlations between domestic and transnational terrorism were anticipated because "planned domestic terrorist incidents may occasionally result in collateral damage to foreign interests, thereby giving rise to transnational terrorist events."[200]

The inclusion of both domestic international attacks and foreign attacks into a single concept, while criticized here, is not altogether arbitrary. Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev attribute the seeking of media attention and cross-border safe havens as a reason for a correlation between domestic and transnational terrorism.[201] Bruce Hoffman includes both in his description of transnational terrorism.[202] The reason for this inclusion is quite understandable, because international targets, both domestically and abroad, were pursued because doing so would create a larger and more significantly noticed event than if only domestic, non-international targets were pursued. Hoffman writes:

> For the first time, terrorists began to travel regularly from one country to another to carry out attacks. In addition, they also began to target innocent civilians from other countries who often had little if anything to do with the terrorists' cause or grievance, simply to endow their acts with the power to attract attention and publicity that attacks against their declared or avowed enemies often lacked.[203]

In summary, terrorists pursue international targets both domestically and abroad because it gives the attack, and by extension the group and cause, greater publicity and notoriety. However, the theoretic and empiric similarities between domestic and foreign international targets ends there. Most major studies on transnational terrorism have not recognized the difference between these two phenomena.

There are occasions where the standard definition is appropriate, but its appropriate usage highlights the need for differentiation. Powers and Choi try to determine the impacts of business-related "transnational" terrorism and use the International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset.[204] Their specific question is asking the impact on international targets, specifically multinational business. Therefore, the usage of the standard definition is most appropriate since attacks anywhere against international businesses need to be included.

200

However, the term international terrorism would be more appropriate here. Most questions asked of transnational terrorism include domestic attacks against international targets and transnational attacks in foreign countries. This causes the problem of answers being more appropriate to one understanding and not the other, or neither.

Few scholars h

and “foreign” terrorism in assessing the impact of press attention on incidents of terrorism, in which the crossing of international borders is the critical difference.[210]

However, the conclusions of the George article, versus others that test the same hypothesis, show the importance of disaggregating the concept. Consider the following. If the George distinction is not made, and all attacks on foreign property and persons are considered transnational terrorism, then failed states will be seen as major sources of transnational terrorism, as some have concluded.[211] However, if transnational terrorism is only those attacks in which an attacker crosses international borders, then failed states are *not* major sources of transnational terrorism as George finds. These are fundamentally divergent findings resulting from improper conceptual conflation.

These broad conceptualizations of transnational terrorism are insufficient for two reasons. First, there are fundamental differences - in planning, execution, and prevention - between an attacker carrying out an attack in their home country against a foreign government’s interests and an attacker traveling to another country to carry out an attack in the foreign government’s homeland. For example, various factors that influence terrorism have varying influence on the event if an international border was crossed or not. “[W]e expect that the pull of press freedom is greatest when terrorists cross international boundaries because these attacks are more likely to be designed with international audiences in mind than strikes by domestic perpetrators.”[212]

Furthermore, Gardeazabal and Sandler find that countries that participate in INTERPOL programs helping them screen people and documents at border crossings, where transnational terrorists must pass to successfully carry out their attacks, could decrease the number of transnational attacks in their country.[213] This demonstrates the differences between the types of terrorism since INTERPOL restrictions on international movement will have no impact on actors that remain in their home country. Also, as stated above, George finds that failed states produce more transnational terrorism domestically but do not produce more transnational terrorists traveling abroad.[214]

Second, the common understanding of transnational terrorism is when a non-citizen is associated with a foreign threat but brings that violence to the homeland, and broader conceptions are

210

around the world since 1980.”

contributing factor in levels of terrorism."[241] Rapoport argued that the world has seen four successive and overlapping waves of terrorism, the fourth beginning in 1979.[242]

According to Rapoport, the first wave was the beginning of modern terrorism as a series of assassinations that swept Czarist Russia following political and economic reforms. The second wave began in the 1920s and was primarily motivated by anti-colonialism. The third wave was motivated by revolutionary movements of the 1970s. Rapaport says the term international terrorist came into usage during this time because of bonds between revolutionary groups in different countries, but also because the training camps of one group, namely the Palestinian Liberation Organization, were available to others who sought to spark revolution in their own countries. Robison, Crenshaw, and Jenkins look at the decline of leftist terrorism and the rise of Islamic terrorism and attribute the wave-like shift to changes in social conditions.[243] The decline in leftist terrorism is attributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the rise in Islamic terrorism is attributed to modernization, competition between religions, and the rise of secular government.

Two events in 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, provided the religious foundations for the fourth wave. While Rapaport says that Islam produced the most active groups, he notes that groups of other religious faiths were involved in the fourth wave. Systematic analysis confirms Rapaport's conception of waves of types of groups and tactics.[244] It has also been shown that the prevalence of Islamic terrorism has shaped global trends in target types. "… since

Recent scholarship has shown the complex relationship between religious extremism and terrorism. Countering the narrative that terrorist incidents are increasing in lethality because of religious justifications like martyrdom, suicide attacks, and excommunication of potential targets, Klein argues that lethality is related not to religious fundamentalism but by recruitment interests.[247] Attacks near the organization's recruitment base will take great effort to avoid unnecessary collateral damage. Conversely, substantial collateral damage outside of an organization's recruitment base will not adversely impact their recruitment efforts.

are positively associated with hostage-taking, while executive constraints are negatively associated.[251]

Gelpi and Avdan argue that the current literature on democracy and transnational terrorism has overstated the importance of democracy as a predictor by showing that democracy provides no predictive leverage in models trying to forecast incidents of terrorism.[252] Piazza showed that young democracies are more prone to terrorism than are old democracies.[253] Piazza also showed that dictatorships experience less terrorism than any other regime type, regardless of age. Wilson and Piazza show that single-party authoritarian regimes experience lower levels of terrorism compared to both democracies and military regimes.[254] They argue that this is because single-party regimes have a wider range of options in terms of coercion and co-option compared to other regimes. Different agents of a democratic state respond differently when confronted with transnational terrorism. Particularly, agents of the military are more likely to respond to transnational terrorism with torture.[255]

Claims are frequently made that there is a strong connection between press freedom and the likelihood of being the target of transnational terrorism. Studies have shown that there is ish-4 (t) 0 0 0 s4 (c) 4 (

Pape has argued that democracies are perceived by terrorists to be easier to manipulate and are therefore selected as targets more often.[258] Pape's study specifically has been criticized[259]

have more instances of both domestic and transnational terrorism.[266] Redefining transnational terrorism may alter this finding. Furthermore, Piazza finds that of political, socioeconomic, and cultural discrimination, only socioeconomic discrimination is consistently a statistically significant predictor of terrorism.

National responses to transnational terrorism usually bring about debates about human rights/civil liberties and security. However, Walsh and Piazza found that states that respect physical integrity rights suffer fewer terrorist attacks.[267] Physical integrity rights are protections against political imprisonment torture, disappearance, and extrajudicial murder. The authors argue that this is because those governments that violate physical integrity rights lose domestic and international support and that the collection of information on terrorists and organizations is more difficult.

E. Poverty and Economic Conditions

Poverty's relationship to terrorism is a complicated one. Poverty and poor economic opportunities are often cited as things that need to be combated in order to reduce the causes of terrorism, rather than just alleviate the symptoms. Choi and Luo argue that economic sanctions

and terrorism is indirect, complicated and probably quite weak."[273] Some studies have explored these complicated paths.

For example, Li and Schaub show that economic development in a country, as well as development of their top trading partners, reduces the incidents of transnational terrorism.[274] They also find that increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) do not increase incidents of

challenge the status quo.[281] International tourism can also impact incidents of transnational terrorism.[282]

Positive and cooperative interactions between states can invite terrorism from non-state groups that wish to spoil or disrupt such cooperation.[283] If the terrorist group is influenced by a foreign state, that state may encourage attacks to weaken the bargaining positions of other states in order to pursue their diplomatic strategies. If the terrorist group is not influenced by a foreign state,

concerns over whether immigrants and diaspora groups may be more likely to sympathize with and perpetrate violence on behalf of terrorist organizations has been a steady discussion point."[286]

The Taliban in Afghanistan began their existence in, and drew upon recruits from, refugee camps in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation and subsequent civil war. According to one study, "… the dismal conditions within refugee camps and the treatment of the refugees by host states can contribute to the radicalization of refugees."[287]

One study found that refugees present a risk for terrorism in two ways. 1) increased humanitarian aid to a conflict/refugee area increases opportunities for military groups to attack foreign targets, and 2) countries with large numbers of refugees are more likely to experience both domestic and transnational terrorism.[288] However, recent scholarship casts doubt on this finding.[289] Braithwaite and Chu found that civil wars that end in rebel victories (rather than incumbent victories) present a greater threat of foreign fighters returning home and engaging in terrorism.[290]